

tend to facilitate achievement of prior objectives of the act.

The "global quota" arrangement of the present law would be eliminated. The quota of any country with which the United States severs diplomatic relations would continue to be suspended, but would be allocated promptly to specific countries on a temporary basis.

Because present sugarbeet growers will necessarily have to reduce acreage further as a part of the proposed new program, national acreage reserve provisions contained in the 1962 act, under which new production areas were brought in, would not be extended after 1966.

Mr. Speaker, the U.S. sugar industry of course is entitled to change its mind and perhaps has done so on the question of the import fee, but it should be fair-minded in contacting Members of Congress and explain to them that the industry position has changed and why.

It may also be that the U.S. industry was not fully united in its position March 29 of this year on the import fee, and I daresay it is not united right now.

In evaluating the attitude of various interested parties, one should keep in mind the possibility that some U.S. sugar interests may also be heavily involved in foreign sugar, and vice versa.

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana. Is not that fee the same as that which prevailed in prior sugar legislation?

Mr. FINDLEY. It is very similar to the import fee which was assessed against the Dominican Republic during the Eisenhower administration and was in effect in the legislation which operated in 1962, 1963, and 1964.

INSTRUCTOR IN HISTORY WELCOMES VIETCONG VICTORY

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I have just read on the wire that an instructor in history at Drew University, James Mellen, has declared himself as welcoming a Vietcong victory in Vietnam.

This despite over a hundred thousand American soldiers fighting to prevent such a victory. This despite American and Vietnamese being killed to prevent such a victory. It is just quite possible that this self-proclaimed Marxist is trying to attract a little attention to himself. I am sure the Republic will survive. It has survived the early "Mellenheaded" thinking of Benedict Arnold who wished a victory for the other side when this country was engaged in another war.

Having once served on the faculty at Rutgers University I believe completely in academic freedom, even the free and full expression of fools in and out of academic circles and, therefore, I recognize Mr. Mellen's right to full expression. And I have a right to find his view appalling and disgraceful as well as unenlightened. He obviously does not know what a Vietcong victory entails.

When I was in Vietnam I saw what a Vietcong victory meant in some villages.

It means hands chopped off. It meant young men dragged off for training against their will. It meant the stealing of all village food and medical supplies in the name of liberation. It meant the displacement of hope with fear. All because the South Vietnamese find it objectionable that they surrender their freedom to something called the liberation front, alias the Vietcong, alias the Communist army of North Vietnam.

Mr. Mellen, in proclaiming himself a Marxist, would indicate that while he is an instructor of history, he has not learned well the lessons of history. Even the Russian leaders admit that pure Marxism is unworkable. And everyone knows that history has never disclosed one country that has chosen communism in a free election.

It is common knowledge that the Vietcong are having some difficulty with their recruiting drive. Since Mr. Mellen has such strong convictions about welcoming a Vietcong victory, perhaps he should be given the opportunity to fight with the Vietcong and thus translate his words into a more meaningful note. I would be very happy to intercede in his behalf in making the necessary arrangements. Perhaps we could trade him for some of the American prisoners of war before they are murdered in cold blood by the Vietcong as were the two Americans last week.

In fact, some of our protesting students calling for a Vietcong victory could be included in such a trade and thus the Vietcong would have new recruits and we would save the lives of courageous Americans who are fighting to save the freedom Mr. Mellen and his ilk would have us abandon.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. ARENDS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to ask the majority leader if he will kindly advise us as to the program for tomorrow and of any other information he cares to state.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the distinguished gentleman from Illinois yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, in addition to the program previously announced we will have up tomorrow the conference report on the foreign aid appropriation bill. This is, of course, a very important matter. Members might expect a vote on that conference report.

In addition, we will take up, as previously announced, House Joint Resolution 642, which is the James Madison Memorial Library; H.R. 3142, the Medical Library Assistance Act; and H.R. 6519, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Act.

HOUR OF MEETING TOMORROW

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow.

Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON SHOULD VETO THE NEW IMMIGRATION ACT

(Mr. GONZALEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I have long supported reform of our outdated immigration law and abolition of the infamous national origin system. When the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was before the House in August, I voted for it and against all crippling amendments. One of the crippling amendments that I, along with the leadership, opposed then was a proposal to place a quota on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. The House wisely rejected this proposal. But the Senate version of the bill contained an almost identical provision, establishing a quota of 120,000 persons a year on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. This was one of the most important differences between the two bills. In my opinion, it was the most important difference. The bills went to conference and, as we all know, the conference report recommended adoption of the Senate provision. I offered a motion to recommit the report back to the conference with instruction to reject the Senate amendment establishing a quota for the Western Hemisphere. After my motion failed I voted against adoption of the conference report. I could not in good conscience vote for a so-called reform measure which merely transfers a bad practice from one part of the world to another.

We who have justly criticized the Iron Curtain, Bamboo Curtain, and the Berlin wall have reason to ponder about what we have done to our own hemisphere today. We have, in my judgment, lowered a paper curtain and raised a wall of redtape around our borders. What is worse, these devices are aimed against the peoples of this hemisphere with whom we claim to be partners, neighbors, and even brothers.

The Western Hemisphere quota is ill-advised and unnecessary. Secretary Rusk expressed his strong opposition to it when he said that the amendment would, in effect, place obstacles in the path leading to cordial and harmonious relations with Latin America. It is no secret, for example, that under the language of the amendment, any one country such as Canada could entirely preempt the quota for any year by sending into the United States 120,000 immigrants. Who is to say that the persons administering the new law would not permit this? And what would be the effects on the Latin nations?

It is an unnecessary provision because under the present law immigration from the countries of the Western Hemisphere over the past 10 years has averaged only 110,000. With this new law we are thus creating a problem where there has been no problem in the past.

should continue our balance-of-payments deficit to maintain world liquidity, overlook two other basic points. First, the dollar cannot continue to be a reserve currency if we continue a balance-of-payments deficit of the magnitudes that have prevailed in the past. Sooner or later our liabilities will become so large in relation to our gold reserves that foreign central bankers will no longer believe that the dollar is, in fact, as good as gold and they will not be willing to hold it.

Second, a deficit in our balance of payments does not necessarily and automatically increase world liquidity if the countries which are receiving the dollars cash them in for gold. Their reserves go up but ours go down, and the world total remains the same. To illustrate the point, in the first quarter of this year the deficit in our overall balance of payments, seasonally unadjusted, was \$180 million. But these dollars did not become new additions to total world reserves. Rather, they came right back to the U.S. Treasury Department to be exchanged, along with dollars accumulated in past periods, for some \$800 million worth of gold. A continuance of the dollar outflow would lead to more of the same, a transfer of gold from the United States to the European surplus countries with little or no gain for world liquidity as a whole but with continual decreases in our liquidity.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH

The administration's approach to these twin problems is to move quickly and certainly to balance-of-payments equilibrium and at the same time to move forward in discussions on improving the world's monetary system.

I have pointed out why it is imperative for us to restore equilibrium in our balance of payments. But what, it is asked, do we mean by equilibrium? Is it an exact balance or does it allow for some deficit, say \$500 million, \$1 billion, or even more?

Our feeling in the Treasury is that equilibrium cannot be defined solely in terms of a figure; it is importantly a matter of confidence. Whether a given figure for the overall balance of our international transactions represents equilibrium depends on the particular circumstances at the particular time. But while we may not be able to define in precise numerical terms what equilibrium is, we can say that it does not exist when the United States is continually losing gold. Perhaps, then, the best indication of what equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments is, is what the rest of the world thinks it is. The extent to which they cash in their dollars for gold is, in short, a very useful indicator.

We are seeking the long-run, basic solution to our balance-of-payments deficit through measures which are consistent with our domestic objectives and our foreign policy objectives, and consistent with a growing volume of world trade and capital movements. In brief, our longrun approach is to:

1. Continue to minimize the balance-of-payments impact of Government expenditures abroad.
2. Strive to increase our exports and receipts from foreign tourists.
3. Encourage other developed nations to take on more international financing to relieve us of a disproportionate share.
4. Take measures to encourage more foreign investment here.

To gain the necessary time for these longer run measures, we have undertaken shorter run measures which President Johnson outlined in his message last February 10. These consist of efforts to reduce foreign travel expenditures by U.S. citizens; the extension and broadening of the interest equalization tax; and, most importantly, the request that banks and corporations curtail or ad-

just their activities to lessen the balance-of-payments impact of capital outflows.

The key to success in this program, both in the short run and in the long run, is the business community. For the short run, we must have the effective cooperation of the business community to give us the time for our longer run measures to take effect. And in the long run, the competitive position of American business in relation to the other major trading countries will be critical.

First of all, we must maintain our good record of relative price stability. Second, American business must become more energetic and effective in finding and exploiting foreign markets for American exports.

Shortly after President Johnson announced his new balance-of-payments program on February 10, there was an encouraging swing to a surplus in our balance of payments. It is far too early, however, to conclude that this represents a permanent trend toward equilibrium. Some of the gains were due to special factors, some were one-time gains. We are by no means out of the woods yet. But we do feel that we have a program which is sound and can bring us to equilibrium if all of us follow through on it.

While the subject of world liquidity has only recently come into public prominence, the United States, several years ago, joined with other major countries in comprehensive studies of the international monetary system, its recent evolution, its present effectiveness, and its future. On June 1 of this year, this multilateral study group issued a report which exhaustively examines the possible ways to strengthen the system. In July, Secretary Fowler announced that the United States stood prepared to participate in an international monetary conference that would consider what steps we might jointly take to secure substantial improvements in international monetary arrangements.

On September 10, Secretary Fowler returned from a 10-day trip to Europe during which he exchanged views with officials of seven countries on how we might move ahead to improve the workings of the international monetary system. Secretary Fowler had earlier conferred in Washington with Canadian and Japanese officials.

He found agreement that present circumstances call for a reexamination of the free world's monetary arrangements; that we should begin contingency planning for the possible time ahead when new ways of providing for growth in monetary reserves will become necessary; and that active discussions on negotiations should begin in the near future at the level of policymaking officials.

The annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund beginning next week offers a logical opportunity to start putting the negotiating machinery in motion.

In both the case of the problem of the U.S. balance of payments and that of international monetary reform, therefore, there are signs of progress. I would rather close, however, on a note of caution. A basic change in the world's monetary system will not come about quickly or easily. To reach agreement among all the nations involved on anything so basic will require time and enormous effort.

A lasting improvement in our balance of payments—lasting enough to be meaningful in the context I have described—will also require time and effort.

The President's program is broad aged, requiring some sacrifice of many elements of the population but no unreasonable sacrifice, in our judgment, of any one element. Of course, more tourists would like to bring back more goods duty free from abroad; of course, banks and other lenders would like to lend as freely as possible abroad; of

course, businessmen would like to take advantage of every attractive overseas investment opportunity. Essentially, we are asking these groups to adjust—not halt—these practices, so that confidence in the dollar will be sustained.

If confidence in the dollar is sustained, if the international monetary system evolves in a sensible way, we will have created the best possible environment for the American economy—American businessmen—to demonstrate their formidable competitive strength in the world at large, in the years ahead.

(Mr. RUMSFELD (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. RUMSFELD'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. MARTIN of Alabama (at the request of Mr. HORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, an important commitment in my district makes it imperative for me to be absent tomorrow when the vote will be taken on H.R. 10281, Government Employees Salary Comparability Act. If I were present I would vote for the bill because I believe that Federal employees are entitled to an increase in salary in order to keep pace with the inflationary cost of living, the large part of which is caused by Federal spending in other areas.

(Mr. WALKER of Mississippi (at the request of Mr. MORTON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. WALKER of Mississippi's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

MADISON VIETNAM HEARINGS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GONZALEZ). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, at the time that I conducted the hearings on the war in Vietnam in my district, I pledged that a report would be made on the hearings to Congress and the President. I am today presenting that report to Congress.

At the Madison hearings, conducted in the straightforward format of a congressional committee hearing, serious effort was made to analyze the war in Vietnam and possible future courses of action.

At the outset I would like to emphasize again that prior to, during, and subsequent to the hearings, it was made explicitly clear that the hearings were not specifically authorized by the House of Representatives or any of its committees

but were conducted by me as a Member of Congress.

Today, as I make this report, conditions in Vietnam show little prospect of change. The war promises to continue for weeks, months, and perhaps even years. The need to evaluate its causes and possible solutions remains as great today as it was at mid-summer 1965. In the give and take between constituents and their Representatives, it was obvious the citizenry of this country have given great thought to the war in Vietnam and that they individually have much to contribute to the national dialog from which the force and direction of our Nation's policy must emerge.

Such contributions are an important part of the resources our system of government can bring to bear on the policy-making procedure. In fact, one of the main sources of strength in a democracy is criticism and the role it plays in policymaking.

In the language of Adlai E. Stevenson:

Criticism is simply the method by which existing ideas and institutions are subjected to the test of principles, ideas, ideals, and possibilities. Criticism in its fairest and most honest form, is the attempt to test whether what is, might not be better.

It was in this spirit that the hearings in my district were undertaken.

The hearings conducted in the Second Congressional District of Wisconsin were the first of their kind. They were held in Madison, Wis., on July 30 and 31, 1965. Spectators of all ages and persuasions filled the 350-seat capacity hall of Madison's First Methodist Church to capacity at each of the three sessions. Applause greeted the remarks of almost every witness. Each witness submitted the text of his remarks to the chair immediately prior to testifying and in most instances adhered closely to it.

Questions from myself, and the gentleman from New York [Mr. ROSENTHAL], who joined with me in conducting the first day of the hearings, sought to clarify the statement of each witness. No demonstrations occurred and the hearings proceeded in an aura of mutual respect. A verbatim record of the hearings was made from which this report was prepared. In addition to this report, I have also arranged for the publication of the transcript of the hearing in book form in the near future.

This report represents a synthesis of the content of the statements of each of the 47 witnesses who testified. While every effort was made to emphasize the major points of each witness, in some cases the points drawn from a statement may not be the major point of a given witness' testimony. For purposes of this report, no effort was made to substantiate the facts alleged by the witnesses.

A report of this hearing is being made available to the President and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.

A list of the witnesses in the order of their appearance follows. References in the footnotes are to the page number of the original transcript of the hearings.

EXPERT AND ORGANIZATION WITNESSES

MORNING SESSION, FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1965

Small, John R. W., assistant professor of history, southeast Asia studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Tarr, David W., assistant professor of political science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Sample, Nathaniel W., Dane County Chapter of the United Nations Association, Madison, Wis.

Von der Mehden, Fred, associate professor and chairman of the east Asian studies program, department of political science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Hawley, James P., chairman of the University of Wisconsin Student-Faculty Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Madison.

Allin, Lyndon (Mort), chairman of the University of Wisconsin Committee to Support the People of South Vietnam, Madison.

Anderson, John W., Committee on Social Concerns of the Madison Area Council of Churches, Madison, Wis.

Keene, David, Young Americans for Freedom, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Williams, William A., professor of history, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

AFTERNOON SESSION, FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1965

Massey, Capt. Richard, Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Madison, Wis.

Abrahams, Paul P., Wisconsin Scientists, Engineers and Physicians for Johnson and Humphrey, Madison, Wis.

Carlisle, Donald S., assistant professor of political science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Rice, William G., professor emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School and Rev. Alfred W. Swan, First Congregational Church, Madison; Madison Citizens for Peace in Vietnam.

Engelke, Walter, Madison Chapter of the United World Federalists, Madison, Wis.

Fauber, Richard, Wisconsin Americans for Democratic Action.

Graham, Chester A., Friends Committee on National Legislation, Madison, Wis.

Thompson, Tom, chairman of the Dane County (Wis.) Young Republicans.

Elder, Mrs. Joseph (Joann), President of the Madison (Wis.) Branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Madison, Wis.

Boardman, Eugene, professor of history, University of Wisconsin, Madison; Madison (Wis.) monthly meeting, Religious Society of Friends and the Madison (Wis.) Area Committee of the American Friends Service.

Bollenbeck, Capt. Joseph W., Military Order of the World Wars, Madison, Wis.

Tiffany, Jackson, Madison Area Members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Madison, Wis.

Ludwig, Harry, H.A.N.D., a Madison (Wis.) fundraising Organization to Help Avoid Nuclear Disaster.

Barbash, Mark, Chairman, Madison Young Democrats, Madison, Wis.

Ewen, Stuart, Chairman, Madison DuBois Club, Madison, Wis.

MORNING SESSION, SATURDAY, JULY 31, 1965

Supple, G. E., American Legion, Madison, Wis.

Stark, Evan, cochairman, Student Peace Center, Madison, Wis.

Grengg, Walter, 1510 Chandler Street, Madison, Wis.

Berger, Henry, 801 University Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Scanlon, William J., 222 Lake Lawn Place, Madison, Wis.

Turner, Mrs. Jennie M., 5735 Roosevelt Street, Middleton, Wis.

Weeks, Edwin P., 2309 Carling Drive, Madison, Wis.

Munger, William, 612 University Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Scudder, Bourtal, 5705 Forsythia Place, Madison, Wis.

Smalley, Louise, Route 1, Cottage Grove, Wis.

Paras, Mrs. Jorge L., 1938 Rowley Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Hole, Francis D., 619 Riverside Drive, Madison, Wis.

Kubiak, H. J., 2102 West Lawn Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Amile, Mrs. Gchrt, 1726 Hoyt Street, Madison, Wis.

Weiss, Dr. Peter, 211 Campbell Street, Madison, Wis.

Lornitzo, Mrs. F. A., 2825 Middleton Beach Road, Middleton, Wis.

Franz, Mrs. Robert, 5742 Forsythia Place, Madison, Wis.

Mott, Roger, 529 Clemons Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Compton, Miss Betty, 2310 LaFollette Avenue, Madison, Wis.

Powell, Hugh, 44 North Spooner Street, Madison, Wis.

Radke, Mr. Lester A., 432 West Milfin Street, Madison, Wis.

Gaebler, Rev. Max D., 900 University Bay Drive, Madison, Wis.

REPORT ON THE MADISON VIETNAM HEARINGS— WHY ARE WE THERE?

The search for an answer to this question ran throughout the 2 days of hearings. In the simplest terms, we are there based on a commitment reinforced by a decade of involvement.¹ However, the original Eisenhower-Kennedy commitment was limited to assisting the South Vietnamese fight their war.² In the decade prior to 1954, the Viet-minh emerged as the sole effective political force capable of defeating the French.³ Following the 1954 Geneva Accords, we undertook to support the Diem regime. This effort which appeared to be paying off until Diem, with our concurrence, refused to hold the elections called for by the Geneva Accords.⁴ The failure to hold elections, which everyone, including then President Eisenhower, expected the Communists would win,⁵ brought the Communists back into the south to renew the war they had left off in 1954.⁶ The repressive policies of Diem led to local discontent and to military development of the National Liberation Front,⁷ or the Vietcong as Diem labeled his opposition.⁸ While the two developments give rise to both the contention that the war in Vietnam is not a civil war⁹ and that the National Liberation Front is not an arm of Hanoi¹⁰ but rather a "common front" for various indigenous dissident South Vietnamese, including Communist,¹¹ the fact remains that Diem and successive Saigon governments have been unpopular dictatorships which have resorted to undemocratic means to maintain their power.¹² If the National Liberation Front has legitimate complaints against the Saigon government, it would be tragic if Russia and China were the only ones to recognize them.¹³ In fact, assuming for purposes of argument the achievement of an agreement between Hanoi and the United States to withdraw all outside forces from South Vietnam, South Vietnam would still be torn by revolution since the

¹ Prof. David W. Tarr, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 27.

² Prof. Emeritus William G. Rice, Madison, Wis., p. 153.

³ Prof. John R. Small, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 14.

⁴ James Hawley, Student-Faculty Committee to End the War in Vietnam, p. 63.

⁵ Mr. Hawley, p. 64.

⁶ Professor Small, p. 14.

⁷ Mr. Paul P. Abrahams, Wisconsin Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians for Johnson and Humphrey, p. 113.

⁸ Prof. William A. Williams, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 104.

⁹ Mr. Mark Barbash, Madison (Wis.) Young Democrats, p. 237.

¹⁰ Mr. Stuart Ewen, Madison (Wis.) DuBois Club, p. 243.

¹¹ Mr. Hawley, p. 71.

¹² Mr. Hawley, p. 63.

¹³ Mr. Abrahams, p. 114.

guerrilla war is popular and has the support of 80 percent of the South Vietnamese.¹⁴

WHAT ARE WE ACCOMPLISHING THERE?

Testimony divided sharply over the effect of our presence in Vietnam. While the witnesses did not all address themselves to the same points, the ideas emphasized by each established a clear disagreement between those who thought our presence in Vietnam served our national interests and those who thought otherwise.

The witnesses supporting our presence as being in our national interest did so on the basis of power politics.

The central theme running through their testimony was that we must seek a stable line of demarcation between the Communist and free world areas in Asia as we have in Europe.¹⁵

Failure to maintain a defense line from Korea to Vietnam means we will face the enemy on an inner line from Alaska to Hawaii.¹⁶

In a detailed presentation several witnesses made a compelling argument for American involvement in Vietnam on the basis of various aspects of the Soviet-Sino split and the nature of wars of national liberation.

Russia is cast in the role of the responsible power, which has not renounced wars of national liberation as a method of winning independence, but which has recognized the peaceful path to power as a viable alternative. It has tended to emphasize this as it recognized that limited wars might escalate into a nuclear confrontation with the West.¹⁷

Peiping, on the other hand, is very skeptical about the peaceful or parliamentary path and has emphasized the role of liberation wars and armed struggle as the best means of achieving national liberation.¹⁸

The path of Mao Tse-tung has set the example for Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. It includes the establishment (1) of a vanguard party tied to peasant masses operating in rural, not urban areas, and (2) a liberation army created for the guerrilla phase of a war of liberation. Such wars ultimately lead to conventional warfare with liberated areas serving as prototypes of the country once total victory is won. National fronts are established to join in opposition to what is labeled foreign imperialism and the reactionary established regime. The party emphasizes land and other reforms without mention of socialist transformation and collectivization of agriculture. It is a variant of this program which is reflected in the program and tactics of the Vietcong in South Vietnam.¹⁹

Efforts early in 1957 and 1958 by the Vietcong were aimed at eliminating, through an efficient and well-coordinated program of political assassination, village officials, school teachers and members of welfare teams. The total of these assassinations has exceeded 15,000; 4,000 having been killed in a 12-month period in 1960-61.²⁰ In a number of villages a new mayor could not be obtained, after the first two or three were murdered; schools were closed in some areas for lack of teachers; and assassinations and kidnappings stopped the antimalaria campaign in 1961.²¹ While Diem was not a charismatic leader,

capable of welding his nation together or making the best use of aid moneys, this "Revolutionary Model or Terror" made social and economic reform difficult if not impossible.²²

The outcome of the current confrontation in South Vietnam will enhance or dampen the probability such Communist-inspired wars of national liberation will become the "wave of the future" throughout the underdeveloped areas of the globe.²³

The hard decisions President Johnson is making which close the alternative of violent change and open the opportunity for the emergence of stable, non-Communist political communities based on political freedom and social justice are in our national interest.²⁴

A Vietcong victory would be a success which would encourage Communists to use this kind of assault on governments in adjacent countries.²⁵

Others took more ideological positions. Since World War II, America has been found wherever freedom has been under attack. We face in Vietnam a new challenge to the determination of the United States to prevent the expansion of Communist control around the world.²⁶

"I am against the Communists wherever they may be. We are at war. Let's keep America on her toes so she'll not get knocked down on her knees."²⁷

One witness expressed the view that the Vietnam war had polarized opinion between those individuals who are thoroughly convinced of the peaceful nature of our Government on the one hand and those idealists who see military action as a violation of the basic ideals of our country on the other. The former believe the Government of Red China should be destroyed. They turn on more accessible fellow Americans who question the feasibility of that course of action and charge they are disloyal. The idealists would seek withdrawal as the answer, whereas withdrawal would only convince the enemy of the value of its terrorist approach. The problem is to determine and to apply the optimum military force and political strategy required not to impose victory but to deny victory to the opponent—and do it decisively.²⁸

The central theme of those who believe the nature of our involvement undermines our national interest, emphasized the irony of a country born of a nationalist social revolution should be fighting nationalist social revolutions just 200 years later.²⁹ The effort we are making in Vietnam underscores our failure to recognize the fundamental validity of social revolution³⁰ and reveals that our policies are based on the false assumptions (1) that wars of national liberation are Communist controlled, (2) that communism is monolithic and threatens the United States anywhere, and (3) that Communists must be confronted everywhere.³¹ It was contended that we must start supporting oppressed peoples instead of driving them into the hands of the Communists.³² It was forcefully argued that we must honor in deed the principle of self-determination even if we do not

like all the results. We must move toward a policy of codetermination and be willing to accept limits on our own egos.³³

The life of the Diem regime illustrates the weakness of our policy in Vietnam. If we admit we deposed Diem, we admit we used murder to accomplish our ends. If we deny we deposed him, we admit his policies produced widespread and overt resistance in South Vietnam.³⁴

Many other ways were cited in which the Vietnam war effort was considered to be a disservice to our national interest.

It was argued that the practical consequences of the war are that it could escalate, by calculations³⁵ or mistake into nuclear war³⁶ or major land war in Asia.³⁷ We, in fact, are driving North Vietnam into the embrace of China.³⁸

The moral consequences of the war concerned many witnesses.³⁹ It was contended that our leadership of the free world is jeopardized by support of dictatorships and that our support of such dictatorship is destroying the important "defender-of-the-oppressed" image of America in the hearts of oppressed peoples around the world.⁴⁰ The war, in fact, is becoming one between Americans and Asians.⁴¹

Many witnesses expressed revulsion over the inhumanity of the war. One observed that three out of four persons seeking treatment for napalm burns are women and children.⁴² Another asked how long each of us, as individuals, can acquiesce in the killing on both sides.⁴³ A mother asserted she taught her children the worth of every individual human being but that this was being destroyed by the Government.⁴⁴ Another pointed out that an extended war in Vietnam would result in destruction of people we seek to protect.⁴⁵

It was further contended that international relations must be approached from ethical, humanitarian, and religious points of view—the worth of each person to be respected and his basic rights to self-fulfillment assured.⁴⁶ Resort to war was protested on the grounds that violence is contrary to the will of God.⁴⁷

The costs of the war and the risks of escalation were cited as the basis for a contention that we should take the same risks by seeking nonviolent solutions to the war.⁴⁸

Critics of the war cited its domestic consequences. It was asserted that war is altering the shape of domestic politics—jeopardizing the role of Congress in our Government,⁴⁹ and that anticommunism is becoming

¹⁴ Professor Williams, p. 102.

¹⁵ Professor Williams, p. 100.

¹⁶ Mr. Walter Grengg, Madison, Wis., p. 280.

¹⁷ Mr. Chester Graham, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Madison, Wis., p. 194, and Mr. Jackson Tiffany, Madison (Wis.) area members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, p. 227.

¹⁸ Mr. Hawley, p. 62.

¹⁹ Mr. Grengg, p. 280.

²⁰ Mr. Hawley, p. 66.

²¹ Mr. Graham, p. 191.

²² Mrs. Jorge Paras, Madison, Wis., p. 312.
²³ Mrs. F. A. Lornitzo, Middleton, Wis., p. 329.

²⁴ Mr. John W. Anderson, Committee on Social Concerns of the Madison (Wis.) Area Council of Churches, p. 82.

²⁵ Mrs. Louise Smalley, Cottage Grove, Wis., p. 309.

²⁶ Professor Rice, p. 151.

²⁷ Prof. Eugene Boardman, Madison, Wis., monthly meeting Religious Society of Friends and the Committee of the American Friends, p. 208.

²⁸ Mr. Francis D. Hole, Madison, Wis., p. 315.

²⁹ Mr. Tiffany, p. 230.

³⁰ Mr. Richard Fauber, Wisconsin Americans for Democratic Action, p. 174.

¹⁴ Mrs. Robert Franz, Madison, Wis., p. 334.

¹⁵ Rev. Max Gaebler, Madison, Wis., p. 350.

¹⁶ Capt. Joseph W. Bollenbeck, Military Order of the World Wars, Madison, Wis., p. 218.

¹⁷ Prof. Donald S. Carlisle, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 132.

¹⁸ Professor Carlisle, p. 132.

¹⁹ Professor Carlisle, p. 135.

²⁰ Prof. Fred von der Mehden, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 48.

²¹ Professor von der Mehden, p. 48.

²² Professor von der Mehden, p. 53.

²³ Professor Carlisle, p. 135.

²⁴ Professor Carlisle, p. 138.

²⁵ Prof. David W. Tarr, p. 28.

²⁶ Mr. Barbash, p. 235.

²⁷ Mr. Roger Mott, Madison, Wis., p. 339.

²⁸ Prof. Hugh Powell, University of Wisconsin, Madison, p. 341 et seq.

²⁹ Mrs. Bourlai Scudder, Madison, Wis., p. 305.

³⁰ Mr. Hawley, p. 68.

³¹ Mr. Evan Stark, Madison (Wis.) Student Peace Center, p. 266.

³² Mr. William Munger, Madison, Wis., p. 302.

ing as blind an emotion as the tragic anti-semitism of the Nazis.⁵⁰ Children must morally choose between war as a way of life and disobeying the government.⁵¹ It was argued that we are following Goldwater policies rejected in 1964.⁵²

Others cited the international consequences of the war. Bypassing the peace-keeping powers of the United Nations weakens the U.N.⁵³ and is as detrimental to the U.N. as bypassing the League of Nations was for it.⁵⁴ Our longstanding commitment to world order under law requires us to give the U.N. primacy in foreign affairs.⁵⁵ We must stop relying on the self restraint and the rationality of the very men we damn as unreasoning fanatics to avoid a nuclear holocaust.⁵⁶

The success of the Vietcong in destroying American aircraft and barracks, rather than discouraging the Vietcong, is demonstrating to them the great ease with which simply armed guerrillas can deal with the great power of America and it encourages guerrillas in other lands to do their worst.⁵⁷ Our action erodes international law since we have no legal right to intervene and force on them the form of government most beneficial to us.⁵⁸ We are waging an offensive military action which amounts to conducting a war without the required constitutional declaration of war by Congress.⁵⁹ It is impossible to think the United States can play the part of solitary policeman to mankind or to fight guerrilla war throughout Asia.⁶⁰ We can win the war only if we are prepared to commit genocide on all the people who live there—the use of napalm in Vietnam and gas chambers in Germany are hard to distinguish.⁶¹

It was also contended that by the manner of our conduct in Vietnam we have virtually insisted that the enemy attack us so that we might justify our aggressive intentions not only toward North Vietnam but also toward China.⁶²

ALTERNATIVES

Several alternative courses of action are open to the United States. Alternatives fall roughly within six possible courses of action.

1. Create a stable South Vietnamese Government before withdrawing our forces.
2. Invade North Vietnam with or without bombing Red China to achieve victory over the Vietcong.
3. Hurt the Vietcong and North Vietnam sufficiently so that they will scale down their demands, making the negotiation of a compromise settlement possible.
4. Unnegotiated, unilateral withdrawal of American forces.
5. Negotiated settlement leading ultimately to a united Vietnam under a coalition government.
6. Intervention by the United Nations or other multilateral proposals.

⁵⁰ Mr. Grengg, p. 281.

⁵¹ Mrs. Lornitzo, p. 329.

⁵² Mr. Harry Ludwig, Madison (Wis.), HAND (Help Avoid Nuclear Disaster), p. 232.
⁵³ Mr. Nathaniel W. Sample, Dane County, (Wis.), chapter of the United Nations Association, p. 42.

⁵⁴ Mr. Graham, p. 192.

⁵⁵ Mr. Walter Engelke, Madison (Wis.), chapter, United World Federalists, p. 171.

⁵⁶ Professor Williams, p. 102.

⁵⁷ Mr. Fauber, p. 178.

⁵⁸ Mrs. Gehrta Amlie, Madison, Wis., p. 325.

⁵⁹ Professor Rice, p. 155, and Miss Betty Compton, Madison, Wis., p. 340.

⁶⁰ Rev. Alfred Swan, First Congregational Church, Madison, Wis., p. 162.

⁶¹ Mrs. Franz, p. 334.

⁶² Dr. Peter Weiss, Madison, Wis., p. 327.

First two alternatives: (1) Create stable South Vietnamese Government before withdrawing forces. (2) Invade North Vietnam with or without bombing Red China to achieve victory over Vietcong

One witness cited the fact that premature negotiations with an enemy while his forces occupy South Vietnam serve only as tacit admissions that Communist North Vietnam had a right to invade and conquer South Vietnam. He contended that we must stand and fight until all North Vietnam forces are eradicated from South Vietnam.⁶³ Similar views to the effect that only in a country free from Communist control can people achieve self-determination, self-sustaining economic growth and political freedom.⁶⁴

Other witnesses countered with the contention that the creation of a stable South Vietnamese Government would involve a force of up to one million American men with the prospects for success uncertain.⁶⁵

Testimony in favor of the second alternative was only inferential. A single witness urged the employment of such military measures as would insure the destruction of the forces of aggression—at both the place of their attacks and at the source of their power—as military judgment decides.⁶⁶

Other witnesses shied away from endorsing such action on the grounds that it would involve too great a risk of a third world war and would involve too much land to effectively man against guerrilla attack,⁶⁷ and that the over-commitment of American ground power would invite Communist mischief in other key areas of the world.⁶⁸

Third alternative: Hurt the Vietcong and North Vietnam sufficiently so that they will scale down their demands, making negotiation of a compromise settlement possible

Testimony on this alternative, which comes as close as any to characterizing present administration policy, divided three ways.

First, in terms of the Sino-Soviet split, our efforts are designed to demonstrate to Chinese-inspired advocates of wars that they are not the wave of the future.⁶⁹ Witnesses supporting this alternative expressed the belief that firmness is the only possible way to meet the Communist threat to our way of life⁷⁰ and that we must put forth great efforts there against the Reds to let them know we mean business.⁷¹ Another witness thought the symbolic value of the conflict had been set too high, that references to such phrases as "national honor," "defense of free people" and the unspecified "Communist threat" frame the struggle in philosophically rigid terms, that the people should be prepared to accept a stalemate, and that there is no need to win it but every reason to avoid ignominious defeat.⁷² The same witness felt that our Nation's course was set: We must make the war costly enough for the Vietcong and North Vietnam to convince them a political settlement must be accomplished while avoiding two dangers—(a) escalatory measures to

⁶³ Mr. Tom Thompson, Madison (Wis.) Young Republicans, p. 197.

⁶⁴ Mr. Lyndon (Mort) Allin, University of Wisconsin Committee To Support the People of South Vietnam, p. 78.

⁶⁵ Professor Small, p. 16.

⁶⁶ Mr. G. E. Sipple, vice chairman of the National Americanism Council of the American Legion, p. 253.

⁶⁷ Professor Small, p. 16.

⁶⁸ Professor Tarr, p. 30.

⁶⁹ Professor Carlisle, p. 140.

⁷⁰ Capt. Richard Massey, Reserve Officers Association of the United States, p. 110.

⁷¹ Mr. Mott, p. 337.

⁷² Professor Tarr, p. 33.

draw China and Russia into the fray and (b) signs of weakness that might convince the rest of southeast Asia we are weakening in our will to check expansion of Communist China.⁷³

Second, in these same terms several witnesses expressed grave concern that Russia and China would be drawn into the conflict before the United States can force negotiation by escalation,⁷⁴ that the current escalation risks plunging the world into nuclear warfare,⁷⁵ and that the American people want peace in Vietnam and are not willing to spend a great amount of lives and treasure for some dubious kind of success.⁷⁶

Third, this policy was characterized as a gamble, at best, with no indication whether it will succeed in negotiation or that what is going to take place after negotiation will be a communistic system or not.⁷⁷ Its feasibility also was questioned. Although it could be expected to require a 300,000-man American garrison, that garrison would have to be maintained over a long period of time. It was thought to be theoretically possible, but not likely to achieve a permanent solution.⁷⁸

Fourth alternative: Unnegotiated, unilateral withdrawal of American forces

Some of the strongest testimony was given on the issue of unnegotiated, unilateral withdrawal. A single witness flatly asserted that all combat units should be withdrawn but then only as rapidly as is feasible.⁷⁹ Other comments reflected a variety of views on the most desirable course of action but uniformly rejected immediate withdrawal as a feasible course of action.

Testimony of several witnesses was premised on the erroneous assumption that other testimony at the hearing would advocate withdrawal. Against this strawman considerable rhetoric was raised.

The whole of Asia would soon be in the control of the Communists.⁸⁰

"We strongly contest the morality of abandoning a free people, who lack the capability of defending themselves, to a ruthless invader."⁸¹

U.S. withdrawal—disastrous in much of Asia.⁸²

American military presence (in Vietnam) lengthens freedom's duration in India.⁸³

We have no choice, just as we had no choice fighting the totalitarianism of Hitler and Tojo.⁸⁴

Withdrawal advocates are the intellectual heirs of Neville Chamberlain.⁸⁵

Withdrawal would make self-determination unrealistic in view of terror, manipulation, and intimidation.⁸⁶

Complete victory for Vietcong would be a sharp rebuff to American power and commitment in Asia tending to undermine the security of all other non-Communist countries.⁸⁷

Yet even strong critics of the underlying administration philosophy did not recommend withdrawal as a possible, feasible, or desirable course.

⁷³ Professor Tarr, p. 30.

⁷⁴ Mr. Sample, p. 43.

⁷⁵ Miss Compton, p. 341.

⁷⁶ Mr. Abrahams, p. 119.

⁷⁷ Professor von der Mehden, p. 51.

⁷⁸ Professor Small, p. 17.

⁷⁹ Miss Compton, p. 341.

⁸⁰ Mr. Mott, p. 338.

⁸¹ Mr. Sipple, p. 257.

⁸² Mr. Barbash, p. 237.

⁸³ Mr. Bollenbeck, p. 221.

⁸⁴ Mr. Thompson, p. 196.

⁸⁵ Mr. Keene, p. 86.

⁸⁶ Mr. Allin, p. 78.

⁸⁷ Professor Tarr, p. 30.

I not only consider it unrealistic in the sense of domestic American political considerations, but I consider it psychologically out of this world. No major nation involved in the predicament we are now involved in turns around and walks off.⁸⁸

I don't wish to see South Vietnam completely overrun and those people who represent somebody down there killed, which I think is what would happen.⁸⁹

I am opposed to plain withdrawal for such an effort would encourage other wars of liberation.⁹⁰

It looks in terms of reality that negotiations will have to come about before the United States even considers withdrawal.⁹¹

We do not advocate abandonment of the people of Vietnam, but a different kind of commitment to freedom dedicated to life on the land rather than death from the skies.⁹²

The United States will not withdraw and leave South Vietnam to the Vietcong. Wars do not end that way.⁹³

Fifth alternative: Negotiated settlement leading ultimately to a united Vietnam a coalition government

Aside from the broad consensus against unnegotiated, unilateral withdrawal, the other area of strong consensus was in support of a negotiated settlement now with the frank acknowledgment that the result will ultimately be a united country under Communist, but not Chinese, influence.⁹⁴ Central points of agreement were that even a Communist Vietnam would not be dominated by Red China,⁹⁵ that Ho Chi Minh could, in fact, become the Tito of this part of the world,⁹⁶ that attempted Chinese military intervention would face the same guerrilla war we face,⁹⁷ that such a result setting up Vietnam as the Tito of Asia is not likely to be popular, but it is more in the real interests of the United States than hopes for establishing a viable non-Communist South Vietnam, notwithstanding that some active anti-Communists would actually be persecuted,⁹⁸ and, finally, that the administration will have to accept the need to negotiate with the Vietcong if such a political settlement is to be achieved.⁹⁹

Various detailed procedures within the general framework of a negotiated compromise settlement were put forward. Their principal provisions included:

1. Stop bombing North Vietnam.¹
2. Establish a cease-fire.²
3. Negotiations between two contending governments in South Vietnam³ or between all involved governments including the National Liberation Front.⁴
4. An American commitment to honor the results of that election,⁵ to withdraw its

military forces in favor of a United Nations Force after that election.⁶

5. Incidental variations offered by witnesses include a great-power guarantee to Vietnam,⁷ general amnesty for political prisoners,⁸ and strict neutrality agreements from the reunited nation.⁹

Other support for this alternative came in more generalized statements.

Negotiate with Nguyen Hun Tho, chairman of NLF; they may prefer a neutralist position.¹⁰

Never resist the call by the North Vietnamese, Red China or the Vietcong to the bargaining table; never forget your promise, America's promise of assistance to both the aggrieved and the aggressors.¹¹

Reservations were expressed about recognizing the Vietcong because that could be somewhat of a diplomatic defeat for the President¹² and other reservations were directed against the cease-fire proposal in view of the aggressive response made by the terrorists during an earlier suspension of bombing attacks against North Vietnam.¹³

Sixth alternative: Intervention of the United Nations or other multilateral proposals

The belief that our efforts at negotiations needed increased emphasis, particularly with respect to the Vietcong, also was reflected in much of the testimony of those who felt the United Nations should be brought into the conflict.

Most felt the United Nations could serve a useful purpose in bringing about the end to hostilities essential to any negotiations and observed that our efforts toward that end fell short of requesting U.N. intervention.¹⁴ Various witnesses expressed a belief the United Nations could—

1. Arrange a cease-fire¹⁵ and maintain a truce.¹⁶
2. Enforce a truce for a reasonable cooling-off period prior to elections.¹⁷
3. Manage free elections.¹⁸
4. Arrange an international guarantee of the borders of southeast Asian countries.¹⁹
5. Reconstitute a customs and payment union between North and South Vietnam.²⁰
6. Channel multilateral economic and social development programs for all southeast Asia.²¹

Arguments in favor of United Nations involvement were expressed in a variety of ways:

We believe the United Nations offers the best possibility for freeing the opposite side from its intransigent position and starting meaningful negotiations.²²

It is essential that we get a third institution imposed between the United States and the Vietnamese on the one hand and between the United States and China and Russia on the other.²³

A real sincere, earnest all-out effort to divert the task to the United Nations now will

do more to enhance the real needs for peace and food in Vietnam than all the soldiers and bombs the Pentagon has.²⁴

As a signatory to the U.N. Charter, we are obligated to ask for U.N. intervention. It is a realistic and honorable way out of the hopeless dilemma in southeast Asia.²⁵

Some skepticism over the possible effectiveness of any United Nations effort was expressed. Since the war is basically a clash of power, the United Nations is not likely to contribute substantially to finding a solution, although it might be useful in enforcing a negotiated settlement.²⁶ On the other hand, since the United States still has a lot to say about what the United Nations does, if the U.N. goes into Vietnam without full U.S. support, it won't settle anything.²⁷

Others emphasized the fact that Vietnam is one of a continuing series of problems for which the capabilities of the United Nations must be explored and developed. Detailed attention must be given U.N. peacekeeping responsibilities, powers, and authority.²⁸

Other proposed courses of action emphasized multilateral solutions. One witness proposed a 14-nation conference to arrange a ceasefire and guarantee the borders of southeast Asian countries and to establish a planning bank capable of including all southeast Asian countries.²⁹ Others urged a multilateral, international Federal Union for Defense designed to take on duties we have assumed unilaterally in Vietnam and elsewhere,³⁰ and an international referendum on peace designed to elicit and concentrate the desire of individuals around the world for peace on the problems standing in the way of peace.³¹

The problems surrounding the war in Vietnam also evoked suggestions that our Asian policy and our China policy in particular need reassessment,³² ranging from opening negotiations with the Peoples Republic of China on a broad range of issues³³ to bringing the Communist countries into the world community, admitting them to the U.N. to show them how we are working to solve the problems of our society.³⁴

ASSESSMENT OF THE HEARINGS

Mr. Speaker, each reader will, of course, come to his own conclusions on the success of the Madison Vietnam hearings.

For my own part, it is not enough to say that the hearings provided an opportunity for differing points of view to present their ideas to their Representative and through him to the Congress and the President, although that is an important part of the hearings for the witnesses who testified. It is not enough even to say that the hearings increased public awareness and knowledge of the complex issues at stake in Vietnam, which certainly was accomplished by the wide attention given the hearings in the press and on television. Nor is it enough to say that the witnesses contributed to the building of a consensus on our involvement in the war in Vietnam.

Nor can the value of the hearings be judged by such ulterior considerations

⁸⁸ Professor Williams, p. 103.

⁸⁹ Mr. Abrahams, p. 124.

⁹⁰ Professor Rice, p. 165.

⁹¹ Mr. Ewen, p. 249.

⁹² Mr. Tiffany, p. 229.

⁹³ Mr. Hawley, p. 70.

⁹⁴ Professor Small, p. 17.

⁹⁵ Mr. Hawley, p. 74.

⁹⁶ Professor Small, p. 18.

⁹⁷ Professor Small, p. 22.

⁹⁸ Professor Small, p. 20.

⁹⁹ Professor Tarr, p. 33; Professor Williams, p. 104; Mr. Hawley, p. 71; Professor Rice, p. 158; Mr. Ewen, p. 243; Mr. Stark, p. 277; Mr. Edwin P. Weeks, Madison, Wis., p. 298; Mrs. Lornitzo, p. 331; and Mrs. Franz, p. 335.

¹ Mrs. Lornitzo, p. 331.

² Professor Rice, p. 158; Mrs. Lornitzo, p. 331; Mr. Ludwig, p. 233; Professor Boardman, p. 212.

³ Professor Williams, p. 103.

⁴ Mrs. Franz, p. 106; Mr. William Scanlon, Madison, Wis., p. 285; and Mr. Ewen, p. 243.

⁵ Professor Williams, p. 103; Mr. Weeks, p. 299.

⁶ Professor Williams, p. 103; Professor Rice, p. 165.

⁷ Professor Small, p. 19.

⁸ Mrs. Lornitzo, p. 331.

⁹ Mr. Weeks, p. 299.

¹⁰ Mrs. Franz, p. 109.

¹¹ Mr. Scanlon, p. 289.

¹² Mr. Stark, p. 278.

¹³ Mr. Sipple, p. 261.

¹⁴ Mrs. Joseph Elder, Dane County (Wis.) Branch of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, p. 201.

¹⁵ Mr. Tiffany, p. 228.

¹⁶ Mr. Henry Berger, Madison, Wis., p. 285;

Mr. Sample, p. 45.

¹⁷ Mr. Grengg, p. 281.

¹⁸ Mr. Grengg, p. 281.

¹⁹ Mr. Fauber, p. 184.

²⁰ Mr. Fauber, p. 184.

²¹ Professor Boardman, p. 212; Mr. Graham, p. 193; Mr. Tiffany, p. 228.

²² Mr. Anderson, p. 82.

²³ Professor Williams, p. 106.

²⁴ Mr. Sample, p. 43.

²⁵ Mr. Ludwig, p. 233.

²⁶ Professor Tarr, pp. 37-39.

²⁷ Mr. Abrahams, p. 120.

²⁸ Mr. Graham, p. 193; Mr. Engelke, p. 172.

²⁹ Mr. Fauber, p. 184.

³⁰ Mrs. Jennie M. Turner, Middleton, Wis., p. 292.

³¹ Mr. H. J. Kublak, Madison, Wis., pp. 319-321.

³² Mr. Graham, p. 193.

³³ Professor Boardman, p. 213.

³⁴ Mrs. Turner, p. 293.

as whether the dissent from administration policy voiced at the hearings encouraged our enemies, or whether other grassroots hearings in the same format and serving the same purposes followed in other congressional districts.

Much can be said on each of these points and while a reading of even this brief outline of the substance of the hearings shows that the interests of the United States and democracy were served by the hearings, one must judge these questions for himself.

It is clear, however, that the people have given great thought to our involvement in Vietnam and they do have a contribution to make to the development of policy on the basis of their expertise as well as their commonsense. The catalog of ideas this report contains emphasizes that even for the best-informed and firmly committed policymaker, there remains the challenge of the ideas and interpretations on policy of the electorate. For politicians experienced in the serious business of the day-to-day function of government, this should come as no revelation.

The real test of the hearings, as I see it, is the answer it provides for this important question:

Can the main tenet of democracy, that of government by discussion, be brought to bear on questions of foreign policy in times of crisis?

Needless to say, I believe the Madison Vietnam hearings effectively demonstrated that free discussion and serious dissent can and must be heard, particularly when the institution of democracy is being challenged at home and abroad. The hearings served to revitalize the institution of free speech and affirmatively demonstrated that free speech, rather than sapping our national strength, sustains it. I believe that is true notwithstanding the fact that some of the witnesses expressed reservations about the hearings.

Whether we are to abandon the basic strength of democracy in time of crisis is a serious question for democracy which each generation must answer anew, both at home and abroad. While the true significance of this may be lost on our enemies, that fact should not deny a free society the full exercise of the principles it lives by.

In a democratic sense, the validity of our policies and certainly the strength of the popular support for them is closely related to the extent of participation in their formulation by the electorate.

In its own way the Madison Vietnam hearings provided Congress with an example of the result which could be expected from full congressional hearings. It also provided Congress a clear indication of the problems posing the greatest challenge to the free world and the United States. The future hinges on how we respond to other Vietnams whether they arise as a result of national social revolutions or from wars of liberation. It merits congressional concern, full hearings, and full debate.

Throughout the testimony runs a strong desire for peace. This was true of all the witnesses, regardless of how they viewed the world, questions of war

and peace, and the issues confronting us in Vietnam. If the hearings served only to reaffirm this strongly held belief they served a useful purpose.

A COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gonzalez). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MATHIAS] is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. MATHIAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, the Congress now faces an unprecedented challenge: the challenge of channeling and containing our own Government, to insure that its operations are always in the public interest. As the executive branch has increased in size, complexity, and momentum, full congressional oversight of the bureaucracy has become more difficult. It is impossible for the 535 Members and approximately 12,000 employees of the Congress to keep up with all the activities of about 2½ million civil servants. Yet we must keep up with them, if we are to enforce economy, efficiency, and accountability on all those entrusted with the conduct of the public business.

The two Hoover Commissions of 1947-49 and 1953-55 demonstrated the tremendous contributions to the reform and improvement of public administration which could be made by a blue-ribbon commission with a broad congressional mandate and wide public support. Twenty-three of my colleagues and I believe that the time has come for another comprehensive review of executive operations by an ad hoc agency of Congress. Thus we are introducing today H.R. 11366 and H.R. 23 identical bills to establish a new Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch to conduct a 2-year review of all executive branch operations and report to Congress recommendations for change and reform.

I am proud to announce that I have been joined in this effort by the following Members: Mr. Andrews of North Dakota, Mr. CAHILL, Mr. CONTE, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. ELLSWORTH, Mr. HARVEY of Michigan, Mr. HORTON, Mr. KEITH, Mr. McDADE, Mr. MIZE, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MORTON, Mr. MOSHER, Mr. REID of New York, Mr. REINECKE, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. RUMSFELD, Mr. SCHNEEBELI, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. STANTON, Mr. TUPPER, and Mr. WIDNALL.

Mr. Speaker, the need for an overall look at our Government is clear. First, Government operations cannot be policed just once or twice. Waste, duplication, inefficiency, and bureaucratic conflicts must be constantly attacked. Procedures must be continually revised to incorporate the most progressive methods and technology. Administrative structures must be periodically adjusted to reflect the changing emphases of public policy and the changing relationships among programs, personnel and governmental units. Although some reforms result from congressional authorizations, appropriations and investigations,

a comprehensive study has not been undertaken for 10 years, since the second Hoover Commission ended its work in 1955.

Second, the tremendous administrative growth of the past decade has never been reviewed fully and systematically. Many far-reaching programs have been inaugurated, including the space program, the national highway programs, the National Defense Education Act, more recent educational assistance programs, the wilderness system, air and water pollution programs, the Appalachia program, the antipoverty program, the medicare program and many more. The Federal research and development effort has expanded enormously in cost and scope. New relationships between the Federal Government and State and local governments, private and quasi-public agencies, business and industry, and individual citizens have developed.

Earlier this year, while studying the proposed Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Congress became fully aware of the urgent need for coordination of the vast number of programs in just one field, metropolitan affairs, in order to cut costs, maintain consistent standards, and provide coherent information readily to State and local officials. The need for reform and rearrangement in other areas is equally obvious.

Third, it is time to reassert a strong congressional voice in reform. The executive branch in recent years has not neglected its responsibility to reform itself. This year alone, we have seen the creation of a new Cabinet department, the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the consolidation of meteorological agencies into the Environmental Science Services Administration within the Department of Commerce; the realignment of functions within the Office of Education; and proposals for the reallocation of activities among civil rights units.

Led by the Department of Defense, more and more Federal agencies are reassessing their administrative structures, applying new management techniques, and subjecting their operations to systems analysis. For example, according to a news item, the Department of State is now developing a means of cataloging all its expenditures by country, agency, and purpose.

Most significant by far is the President's recent announcement of plans to extend a new planning and budgeting system throughout the Government. As the President told Cabinet members and heads of agencies on August 25, this new system will enable us to:

1. Identify our national goals with precision and on a continuing basis.
2. Choose among those goals the ones that are most urgent.
3. Search for alternative means of reaching those goals most effectively at the least cost.
4. Inform ourselves not merely on next year's costs—but on the second, and third, and subsequent years' costs—of our programs.
5. Measure the performance of our programs to insure a dollar's worth of service for each dollar spent.

September 30, 1965

mer director of the Catholic Youth Organization in our community.

Throughout his career, Judge Campbell has been a valuable citizen not only in our State of Illinois but in our Nation. He has served as director of the Catholic Charities of Chicago, on the national executive board of the Boy Scouts of America, on the executive board of the Chicago council and on the board of trustees for Barat College, Lake Forest, Ill., Roosevelt College and the University of Chicago. He has also served on the citizen's board for Loyola University, from which he received his bachelor of law degree and his master of law degree.

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to extend to Chief Judge Campbell my sincerest congratulations on the observation of his 25th anniversary on the Federal district bench, to commend him for his countless contributions to his State and to his Nation, and to wish him continuing good health in his service to the people.

I am also happy to insert into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the following editorial which appeared in the Chicago Tribune on September 29 about Judge Campbell:

A GREAT JUDGE

Public officials and leaders of the bench and bar will attend a reception and dinner tomorrow in honor of Chief Judge William J. Campbell of the Federal district court. The event will mark the 25th anniversary of his appointment to the court by President Roosevelt.

He was only 34 years old at that time, and some doubts were expressed about the wisdom of the appointment. The fears vanished long ago as Judge Campbell became known for his industry, integrity, courage, and judicial competence. As chief judge he has presided with exceptional skill over one of the busiest, if not the busiest, court in the United States.

Recently Judge Campbell's judicial and executive talents passed a supreme test when he took the lead in reapportioning Illinois Senate districts after the State legislature had failed to act. The smooth solution of this problem by a panel of Federal judges and the Illinois Supreme Court has attracted national admiration.

The reception and dinner tomorrow will honor one of the most distinguished citizens of Chicago.

Defeat Through Victory

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN A. BLATNIK

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, all of us are concerned about Vietnam. Much has been written about this most important matter but few have expressed themselves as well as Mr. Joseph Kraft in his Washington Post article of September 29, 1965, entitled, "Defeat Through Victory." I am proud to make his views a part of the RECORD:

DEFEAT THROUGH VICTORY

(By Joseph Kraft)

Cynics in Saigon used to say that the only thing worse for the United States than losing

the war in Vietnam would be winning it. Now the full truth of that bitter jest is coming home.

In the past few months, American military efforts have had an undoubted success. The true extent of that success is not yet known. The only certainty is that the other side has not mounted a major action since July 4. But already, thanks to the limited military improvement, a dark shadow has been cast on the prospects for the diplomatic settlement that this country needs as its eventual exit visa from Vietnam.

The first political consequence of the relative military success has been a boost for the military junta comprising the Saigon regime. The Vietnamese generals have used their new strength against all moves for negotiating with the other side.

All summer long, the generals have been successfully resisting American suggestions for an exchange of prisoners with the Vietcong rebels. The three prisoners executed in the stadium at Danang last week were not, as widely reported in the American press, even Vietcong terrorists. They were political opponents of the military regime who had led demonstrations in favor of negotiations.

The attitude of the Saigon generals seems to be shared by many American officials in Vietnam. Military briefings have yielded a flood of optimistic accounts, accompanied by statements that, with the tide running so favorably, it would be a mistake even to talk about negotiating with the other side. That Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge opposed the almost innocuous mention of negotiations in Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's speech to the U.N. General Assembly seems to be an apt expression of the mood in Saigon.

The perceptible stiffening on the part of the Saigon regime and the United States finds its counterpart on the other side. The execution of two American prisoners by the Vietcong this week is only the most dramatic sign of increased Communist militancy on Vietnam.

A far more important sign of the new hard line lies in a formal communique put out by North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on Sept. 23. In the communique, Hanoi, for the first time, denounced President Johnson's various peace offers in the accents of Peiping. Among other terms borrowed from the Chinese, the communique uses the epithets "tricks," "maneuvers," and "mere swindle."

At this same time, the communique does an about-face on the most hopeful note ever sounded by Hanoi on negotiations—the four-point program enunciated by Premier Pham Van Dong on April 8. At that time it was not clear whether the four points were to be conditions for negotiations, or merely a declaration of principles. But it has now become known that on May 18, just before the end of the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, Hanoi officially told Washington through its representative in Paris that the four-point program was not to be considered as a set of preconditions for negotiations.

In the communique of September 23, Hanoi pointedly reverses the May 18 position to make the four points an absolute pre-condition of any talks. The communique says: "The U.S. Government must solemnly declare its acceptance of this four-point stand before a political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be considered."

On both sides, in other words, progress toward negotiations has been braked. Because it seems to be winning militarily, the United States does not seem to be suffering from the new deemphasis on finding a diplomatic solution to the Vietnam problem. Indeed, there are some American officials who believe that with a little more pressure, the Vietcong effort will lose momentum, and then collapse entirely.

In my view, however, the United States, far from being the big gainer in the most recent developments, is the main loser. The history

of guerrilla wars in China, in Vietnam, and in Algeria shows that the insurgents can sustain years of defeat, and still keep going. They have no need, accordingly, for a truce and then a treaty that spells out a settlement.

But this country, unless it is prepared to go on fighting in Vietnam year after year, does need such a treaty. More than any other party to the conflict, in fact, this country has an interest in a formal settlement. For short of a very long war, that is the only way that American obligations to South Vietnam can be honorably met.

The recent military successes, in other words, can serve the long-run American interests only if the victory does not belong to the spoils.

Red Armies, Amid Silence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS C. McGRATH

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, every American, every civilized human being, should be deeply shocked, as I am, at the declaration by the Government of North Vietnam that they intend to execute American servicemen captured by them in the future in utter disregard of the Geneva convention, to which they are a signatory.

It is already sufficiently shocking that the North Vietnamese have committed murder within the past week, executing without trials two captured U.S. servicemen. They were soldiers following the orders of their superiors in war. As such, their execution in obvious reprisal for the executions—after trials—of three Vietcong members convicted by the South Vietnamese of being engaged in terrorist activities out of military uniform and among the civilian population of South Vietnam, can only be considered an act of wanton murder.

The North Vietnamese announcement that uniformed American servicemen captured in the future will be similarly murdered is as great a shock to the sensibilities as were the grisly murders during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and the blatant savagery witnessed in the Congo.

The idea of "civilized warfare" is, it seems to me, a contradiction in terms, yet there are rules by which warfare is conducted and the Government of North Vietnam, by signing the Geneva convention, has pledged itself to conduct warfare within these rules. The murders of uniformed soldiers without trials, and the threats to commit future murders as reprisals must place the Government of North Vietnam outside the group of civilized nations of our world.

Just as disturbing to me, Mr. Speaker, as are the wanton murders of prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese is the complete silence with which the acts already committed and those threatened by that Government has been accepted by the world at large.

When the United States felt it practical to make use of a gas which ren-

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from Fort Bliss to Huntsville. Head of the group was Wernher von Braun.

General Toftoy toured the Nation, without much success, trying to lure industry to Huntsville. In the meantime a group of citizens organized to offer machine shop work to support the new Army Ballistic Agency. That was the birth of Brown Engineering.

Redstone began moving into high gear in 1956 when Gen. John B. Medaris was assigned its commanding officer. Huntsville, then 4.7 square miles, annexed some 40 square miles that year, enabling extension of municipal services and opening the door for new growth. Gov. James B. Folsom held the legislature in session to allow advertisement of an annexation bill.

Citizens built homes or apartments to rent and listed them with the chamber of commerce; and still do today. Another group of citizens bought a deserted textile mill near downtown to turn it into an office complex that now houses 5,000 aerospace workers.

The city donated 300 acres for a University of Alabama Extension Center. The city and county each gave \$250,000, or two-thirds the cost of the building. That building, Morton Hall, was dedicated in 1961.

Alabama citizens also voted a \$3 million bond issue that year to build a University of Alabama Research Center in Huntsville. Established at the request of Marshall Center and the missile command, it supports the graduate and undergraduate programs and received a \$600,000 grant from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

More land was needed for expansion. Again the city and county chipped in \$200,000 each for the property and paid for site improvements. Huntsville has contributed or pledged more than \$2 million in the past 4 years to higher education. The university's engineering graduate program is the South's largest in the number of students enrolled.

To control land development near the research institute and university campus, a nonprofit corporation was formed and the area zoned as a research park. The corporation bought \$1½ million worth of land and sells it to industry at cost plus interest and low development costs. The university gets any profits. Nerrin quotes leading U.S. businessmen as saying: "Without exception, this is one of the most amazing developments taking place in the Nation."

The city is building an average of three schoolrooms a week to avoid double sessions. Last December another 5-mill property tax was passed, 3 to 1, to finance school construction. Huntsville has 82 schools and 80 percent of its 1964 graduates went to college.

The 2-year-old art council held its second annual festival of arts in April. From January through March, 45 cultural events were presented in the area.

Thrasher summed up the impact of Huntsville last fall, telling NASA Administrator James E. Webb: "It is our firm belief that no community in America has done more, or with greater enthusiasm and dispatch, to create a local climate designed to attract and keep the scientists and skilled personnel necessary for a successful space center."

This is why Huntsville can justify a different tag every day of the week. This is why Huntsville has growpower.

The Powerful Society

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. W. E. (BILL) BROCK

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. BROCK. Mr. Speaker, we are all aware of the President's role in averting

an impasse between labor and management in the recent steel case. While the short-term results of this action may be good, it is incumbent on us to ascertain if his power does not negate the independence of free and collective bargaining which I believe is a mainstay in our overall economic system.

The role of government must not be to seek power for its own end, but to expand freedom. While the short-range use of power may be good, it has the effect, sometimes, of endangering initiative, self-confidence, and self-reliance.

In the October 4 Newsweek, Henry C. Wallich provides keen insight into the power of the Great Society. Under unanimous consent I place his article "The Powerful Society" in the Appendix of the Record:

THE POWERFUL SOCIETY

(By Henry C. Wallich)

The President's masterful handling of the steel case has taken us a long step into the Great Society. While the immediate results of the President's action are almost wholly good, this is far from true of all that now seems to be taking shape farther down the road.

What seems ahead is not the usual bugaboo of a drastically enlarged public sector. Instead, new powers are being generated within the existing scope of the public sector, some of which have nothing to do with public expenditures. Will the Great Society give the President intolerable amounts of power?

The size of the public sector has been a test applied by the economists to measure the role of government in the economy. Measured by the ratio of government expenditures to gross national product, the public sector doubled from 1929 to 1940. It gained moderately from 1940 to 1955, and surprisingly little thereafter. Almost all the increase since 1955, moreover, came from States and local authorities. The Federal Government has kept its spending almost perfectly in line with the mounting gross national product. Great Society programs hereafter may help raise the ratio, especially if Vietnam pushes up defense as well. But so far the public-sector threat has been kept at arm's length on the Federal level, where it counts.

THE MANIPULATED

Something else, however is happening. Within the stable share of the Federal budget, new programs are coming in as old ones are shrinkage. Some of the old ones packed concentrated power in small sectors. One need only remember former President Eisenhower's concern at the time of his retirement over the unholy alliance of political figures, military men and large defense manufacturers. The power relationships created by Great Society programs are much broader and more subtle. The poverty program, medicare, rent subsidies, aid to education reach vast new numbers of people. It seems as if in the Great Society everybody will be beholden to the government for benefits, privileges and favors through which he can be manipulated.

A few examples suffice. If the people of a town don't want to handle their poverty funds according to the rules laid down by the director in Washington, he can hold up the money. Some low-income earner may not like the Government's policies in Vietnam—but part of his rent money comes from the present administration, and before he votes it out of office, he wonders whether another would continue the program. A physics professor wants to criticize the Government in public, but his research money comes from the Defense Department, and perhaps he is wise if he keeps quiet. At what point does a healthy preference for the side of our bread that is buttered begin to smack of corruption?

COSTLY POWER

Powers unrelated to the budget also grow. A steel strike is avoided, the inflation threat averted—but at what cost in terms of industry and labor's capacity to bargain? The balance of payments is saved, capital outflows curbed by the President's voluntary program—but how long will it be till these controls must be made statutory? Both uses of power have been good, in intention and in immediate results. The short-run cost of inaction would have been high. But each such tour de force threatens the long-run ability of the Great Society to handle its affairs.

I doubt that a realistic answer will be found in forswearing the President's methods. It would be foolish to argue in the face of success. He probably will not be able to bequeath his power to his successor, although some of it may stick. Certainly it would be worse if Congress made the power statutory.

But we must compensate for a greater role of government on some fronts by strengthening freedom on others. We must see to it that Federal money and Federal control do not become synonymous. States, municipalities, universities and individual recipients of Federal benefits must have the greatest independence in the use of Federal money assigned to them. No doubt this will lead to inefficiency and waste. But it will strengthen the people against their Government and it will help keep the Great Society a good society.

Chief Judge William J. Campbell Celebrates 25 Years on Federal Bench

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, today is the 25th anniversary of Chief Judge William J. Campbell's appointment to the Federal District Court of Northern Illinois.

Marking this milestone in his career, a reception and dinner will be held this evening in his honor by the Bench and Bar of Chicago. It is expected that more than 500 persons will attend including Governor of Illinois Otto Kerner, Mayor of Chicago Richard Daley, Chief Judge John S. Hastings of the U.S. Court of Appeals, and other judges from the Federal appellate and district courts.

Judge Campbell, at the age of 34, was one of the youngest men ever to be named as a Federal judge. He became chief judge of the Federal district court in 1959, and today serves not only in that capacity, but also as chairman of the Budget Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

I have known Judge Campbell for over a quarter of a century and first had the privilege of meeting him when he was U.S. district attorney for the northern district of Illinois and was serving as State administrator of the Illinois National Youth Administration.

The father of eight children, Judge Campbell over the years has maintained his interest in young people and has been actively engaged in youth programs with Archbishop Bernard J. Sheil, for-

dered its Vietcong enemies ill at their stomachs for a brief period, the hue and cry around the world was deafening. This harmless gas—used by the police forces of many of the nations which were most vocal against our use of it in warfare—was not in contravention of any article of the Geneva Convention.

Yet, the world—our friends as well as our enemies—literally “ganged up” on us, and we stopped using the gas.

But in the face of wanton murder by the North Vietnamese, where are those voices of condemnation which felt no compunction about berating the United States for a harmless “legal” act of warfare? There has been no hue and cry over the murders of two captured American airmen. Neither our friends nor our enemies have seen fit to voice complaint or protest.

Is not murder an atrocity of higher magnitude than the causing of upset stomachs?

Mr. Speaker, in the Philadelphia Inquirer of Wednesday, September 29, an editorial entitled “Red Atrocities, Amid Silence,” discusses this point eloquently. For the further edification of my colleagues, I insert that editorial from this outstanding newspaper in the RECORD:

RED ATROCITIES, AMID SILENCE

Where are all the protesters now?

What has happened to the voices of the self-righteous critics of American policy in Vietnam?

Why are they not speaking out with wrathful indignation against the latest atrocities committed by the Communists?

How is it that no mass picketing has been organized at Red embassies and consulates in this country and abroad to demand an end to the brutal, coldblooded execution of American prisoners of war and South Vietnamese civilians?

The Communists in Vietnam have boasted to the world, by radio, that two U.S. servicemen captured in 1963 have been put to death. There was not even the pretense of a trial on any charges. The implication is unmistakably clear that the men, probably selected at random, were murdered for no cause except as a brutal and totally irrational reprisal for death sentences imposed and carried out by the South Vietnam Government against three Vietnamese terrorists who were tried and convicted on capital charges in a South Vietnam court.

As the U.S. State Department asserted, in its official protest of this outrage committed by the Communists, the execution of prisoners of war as an act of reprisal is specifically prohibited by terms of the Geneva convention, which was signed by North Vietnam and most other countries. These executions of captured Americans were, in the State Department's well-chosen words, “two more acts of brutal murder” that “violate the sense of decency of all civilized men.”

On the heels of this atrocity against Americans comes word of an equally barbaric execution of a South Vietnamese village chieftain. Communist guerrillas who overran the area tied him to the village flagpole and shot him. Two other South Vietnamese officials in the village and two South Vietnamese women also were slain, according to official U.S. reports.

Chronic critics of American policy in southeast Asia are fast on the draw when it comes to condemning any and every act by U.S. troops in their efforts to hold the line against Communist aggression. There is a strange silence among these same critics, however, when details of the incessant campaign of Communist terror are brought to light. They

conveniently ignore, also, the fact that the Reds have rejected repeatedly U.S. offers for unconditional peace negotiations.

Misguided advocates of retreat and appeasement, who so glibly urge that “the United States get out of Vietnam,” should give some thought to the horrible fate that would lie in store for the South Vietnamese after they were left, abandoned and defenseless, to the not very tender mercies of the ruthless Red enemy.

Reinforcing Civil Rights

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT N. C. NIX

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. NIX. Mr. Speaker, I wish to express my very favorable reaction to the President's reorganization of the Federal Government's civil rights activities. I deem the result to be one which exemplifies improvements both as to organization and administration of these very vital operations.

Until this change was made Federal civil rights activity was scattered about among a variety of departments and agencies in a rather haphazard fashion. Accordingly, responsibility was hopelessly divided and efficient enforcement of civil rights legislation and policies was seriously hampered.

Consolidation of the apparatus for enforcing civil rights laws is, by virtue of reorganization, a giant step in the right direction. Noting this, the Philadelphia Inquirer commends the action under the President's Executive order in these words which I insert in the RECORD:

REINFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS

The effectiveness of civil rights legislation depends, naturally, upon enforcement. Enforcement can be handicapped if responsibility is dispersed, authority is uncertain, and time and effort are wasted by duplication.

President Johnson's reorganization order is intended to achieve greater coordination of Federal measures to eliminate discrimination by “getting people out of other people's way,” as Vice President HUMPHREY has expressed it.

Getting civil rights laws on the books is one thing; making sure there is no delay or confusion in putting them to work, is another.

Under the reorganization plan there need be no speculation as to which Federal agency handles which phase of civil rights. Thus, the Civil Service Commission will make certain that the Federal Government has no discriminatory personnel policies; the Secretary of Labor will insure compliance by Government contractors with nondiscrimination requirements; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will handle discrimination in private businesses.

The Civil Rights Commission will become the principal factfinding agency in the civil rights field, and the Justice Department will be responsible for coordinating all the Federal enforcement policies in the civil rights area.

The reorganization will do away with certain agencies and streamline others. It should bring about greater efficiency and less buckpassing, in Government efforts to protect and promote the civil rights of all Americans.

Time To Close Job Corps

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Speaker, the \$10 million Job Corps program at Camp Atterbury, Ind., has been an expensive failure thus far, and all indications are that the Government intends to plow more millions into the project.

Controversy, dissension, turmoil, inexcusable behavior and criminal charges have been the result of the project thus far.

A total lack of discipline has been evidenced at the Atterbury Job Corps Center—a basic requirement for our young men in the armed services and in useful occupations.

I was recently appalled to read a Job Corps newspaper publication which featured a story on the draft which was written from the standpoint that being drafted was unlikely and if one was unlucky enough to be drafted his chances of serving in a battle zone were remote.

The article concluded that even if a Job Corps man should be drafted he would likely only be a replacement for some serviceman with more time in service, on regular Army personnel, who are expected to do the fighting and dying in Vietnam.

It has even been suggested by apologists for the administration that the Job Corps experiment in Indiana has not proved to be a success because Indiana is full of rightwing extremists and the people of the Hoosier State are hostile.

This is utter propaganda, of the type we are accustomed to hearing, and the truth of the matter is that the people of Indiana have sought to make these boys welcome.

An Indianapolis racetrack operator recently invited about 30 of the corpsmen as his special guests for an evening's racing, and they responded by shouting obscenities at women; creating a small-scale riot and after being dispersed from the track, threw sticks and stones into the crowds, according to newspaper accounts of the incident.

In an effort to whitewash the situation at Atterbury, where there are twice as many employees on the payroll as there are Job Corps men, the Job Corps hierarchy has dispatched “inspection teams” to Atterbury.

Glowing reports have been issued after these trips. My information is that one group of inspectors was comprised of sociology students just recently graduated from college.

I have inspected the camp myself and found the vocational training facilities woefully inadequate. Perhaps the theory behind such a program is good, but the administration in this instance has been poor.

The Indianapolis News, the leading metropolitan afternoon newspaper in Indiana, has done a fine job of reporting

September 30, 1965

the facts on the Atterbury Job Corps project.

Mr. Ross Hermann, an editorial writer for the News, has visited the camp and interviewed many people connected with the project. His writing is informed, accurate, and constructive. I offer for the RECORD, Mr. Hermann's latest story on the camp, and another article from the Indianapolis Star depicting the recent incident at the Indianapolis Speedrome.

The articles follow:

[From the Indianapolis News, Sept. 28, 1965]

TIME TO CLOSE JOB CORPS?

(By Ross Hermann)

Official discussions of the ill-fated Job Corps center at Camp Atterbury have tended to ignore one of the more obvious solutions: Why not close Camp Atterbury and send its trainees to centers elsewhere?

That suggestion is dismissed without serious consideration by Job Corps officials, among them Federal Project Manager Dr. John H. Kennedy, who says such action would be too expensive and politically explosive.

The present state of affairs at Atterbury suggests, however, that it might be more expensive and politically embarrassing to continue operating the center.

Atterbury's most recent crisis, which brought a three-man inspection team from Washington, centers on the lack of an effective vocational training program, a condition which caused Federal officials to stop sending Job Corps recruits to the local center.

In the absence of new recruits, Atterbury's enrollment is dropping steadily, the victim of mass departures by disenchanted corpsmen and transferrals to other centers. At present, Atterbury has only 269 trainees—down from 632 last spring. If the Federal ban on new assignments remains in effect for long the program could become extinct on its own accord.

In contrast, Atterbury now has 498 employees—almost twice the number of corpsmen.

Local Program Director Dr. James Bryner assures the press that development of the vocational program is progressing and the center will have a capacity enrollment of 2,600 corpsmen by next May. The first of the new recruits, he says, will start arriving this November.

Federal officials, however, are more guarded. The inspection team expressed favorable reaction upon leaving the center, but no decision has been made yet on whether to resume assignments. Federal Director Dr. Otis Singletary, who will receive the team's report tomorrow, will say only that the ban will remain in effect "until such time as they convince me beyond any doubt that a successful vocational training program is in operation."

With the ban in effect and enrollment dropping, program officials have continued spending money in an attempt to regain full Federal favor. With an estimated \$4 million already spent since the camp opened last spring, officials are now putting out another \$1.7 million to renovate barracks. Another \$7 million is expected to be spent in the next year—without definite assurance there will be any corpsmen around by that time.

These facts suggest a conclusion from which Federal and local Job Corps officials shrink. More than \$7 million could be saved if the camp were closed immediately and the remaining corpsmen sent to other centers.

Events of the past 2 weeks indicate the center's troubles are tenacious, particularly in the absence of policy changes officials so far have been unwilling to make.

A month ago, Director Bryner fired nine "resident assistants" (counselors) and declared his action solved all personnel prob-

lems. Last week he dismissed Procurement Director Franklin B. Mitchum, charging "sloppy purchasing procedures." Mitchum, in turn, charges: "I was fired because I repeatedly questioned purchase orders which I thought were out of line. I tried to do my duty to the corps and the taxpayers."

Similarly, Bryner stated recently that all troublemakers had been weeded out of the program. Shortly afterward, according to a sheriff's office report, corpsmen were involved in a riot at the Indianapolis Speedrome, sparked when six of the youths shouted obscenities at women entering a rest room. What might have happened at the Speedrome if "troublemakers" had not already departed the program is a matter of speculation.

Official policy toward discipline is unchanged, despite Atterbury's periodic outbreaks. Federal officials, mindful of their prerogatives, decline to give the local director authority to dismiss delinquents from the program. Such a decision can come only from Washington. And Director Bryner says he is satisfied with present procedures and declines to seek such authority.

These facts, in themselves, inspire little confidence in the corps' future, particularly if the ban on new recruits is lifted. Policies that fail to control 269 corpsmen can hardly be expected to do better with 2,600.

SPEEDROME SPECTATORS, JOB CORPS MEN RIOT [From the Indianapolis Star, Sept. 20, 1965]

A woman was injured Saturday night when a riot broke out at the Speedrome, Kitley Avenue and U.S. 52, between members of the Federal Job Corps stationed at Camp Atterbury and spectators, a deputy sheriff said.

The ruckus started when 6 Job Corps men, sitting at the south end of the race-track with 29 other Job Corps members, began shouting obscenities at women entering a restroom, Deputy Sheriff D. J. Oberlies said.

The Job Corps youths were special guests at the Speedrome.

When 15 of the youths went to stand in front of the restroom at the back of the stands, continuing the vocal barrage, irritated spectators sought to silence them, the deputy said. About 50 persons were involved in the fracas.

After the Job Corps youths finally were ushered from the Speedrome, the six who had started the melee retaliated by throwing sticks and stones into the crowd, the deputy reported.

Arrival of police and deputies halted the melee.

Mrs. Shirley McKinney, 37 years old, 1933 Mann Drive, a waitress at a stand operated by her husband, George N. McKinney, 37, suffered lacerations on her arms when she tried to stop the fighting, the deputy said.

Oberlies declared there was evidence the Job Corps Men who started the fight had illegally purchased beer.

Oscar Brigenbine, 52, 2910 East New York Street, entertainment director of the camp who accompanied the youths, said he was not around when the fighting started.

Speedrome owner Leroy Warriner, 48, former race driver, said the Jobs Corps Men would never again be invited back to the Speedrome.

Ohio State University, delivered a very enlightening address to the town student-assistants in preparation to their welcoming the freshman ladies at O.S.U.

President Fawcett's remarks were made on September 22, 1965, at Columbus, Ohio, as follows:

AN ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NOVICE G. FAWCETT, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

If I were to give a title to my talk this evening, it would be "Why I Like Girls—Like You."

This gigantic institution is like a mighty rocket whose fuse is being lighted this week—a period in which all systems are checked and placed in a "go" position. I trust that the launching will go as smoothly as did that of Gemini 5 a few weeks ago. The success of our mission, of course, and the significance of the data to be retrieved will be determined primarily by the readiness of the university to receive its payload.

And what is that payload? It is the students—not simply because they want to make the journey, but rather because this university is here as a vehicle through which the minds of men—and of women like you—can find expression in all manner of form that keeps alive and growing a unique way of life; that champions freedom; that emphasizes compassion; that thrives on the love of one's fellow man; that places the honest quest for truth above all other values.

I know I need not lecture you (you who are the vigorous and trusted student leaders on this campus) but permit me, please, to share with you an episode that I hope may come to your minds as you meet this quiet or noisy, timid or bold, frightened or overconfident, plain or glamorous, introverted or intrepid freshman who may attempt to avoid you or who may seek your assistance.

A traveler nearing a great city asked a man seated by the wayside, "What are the people like in the city?" and the response was:

"How were the people where you came from?"

"A terrible lot," the traveler replied. "Mean, untrustworthy, detestable in all respects."

"Ah," said the sage, "You will find them the same in the city ahead."

Scarcely was the first traveler gone when another one stopped and also inquired about the people in the city before him. Again the old man asked about the people in the place the traveler had left.

"They were fine people, honest, industrious, and generous to a fault. I was sorry to leave," declared the second traveler.

Responded the venerable one: "So you will find them in the city ahead."

Human nature, as you know, is a variable and unpredictable quality, but I shall be so bold as to predict that most of the new students you meet will be endowed with a positive and enthusiastic attitude toward their exciting venture in higher education. You yourselves are aware of what an inspiring and enriching experience that venture can be, and I know that your own enthusiasm and sense of values will be communicated to all those with whom you have contact.

What are some of the insights and attitudes which will help these young men and women orient themselves toward a new way of life and make this an eventful and meaningful year for them? Certainly loyalty to their university and pride in being a member of this community of scholars are among the important attitudes of mind with which to approach the enriching intellectual experiences which awaits our new students. Again, I believe that most of our young scholars will possess those attributes.

As you well know, there is much to be proud of here—our position as one of the

Instructions to Student-Instructors

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SAMUEL L. DEVINE

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, the very able Novice G. Fawcett, president, the

Stalemate in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JOHN A. BLATNIK

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Speaker, I commend the "Stalemate in Vietnam" by Walter Lippmann, that appeared in the September 30, 1965, edition of the Washington Post to my fellow colleagues. The analysis that Mr. Lippmann presents is an interesting one, indeed, and we can all profit by what he has to say:

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 30, 1965]

TODAY AND TOMORROW: STALEMATE IN VIETNAM

(By Walter Lippmann)

The success of the American buildup in South Vietnam has been very considerable when we measure it by what so many informed people feared last June. The Vietcong has not been able to smash the Saigonese army, to cut the country in half, and in this military disaster to bring about the overthrow of the government in Saigon. There is reason to think that the size and power of the American forces has discouraged or prevented the Vietcong from mounting big enough battles to win a victory over the Saigonese.

Yet, things have not come out as the administration spokesmen hoped they would.

They allowed themselves to think that a demonstration of our ability to build up a great American force which could not be defeated would compel or persuade the Vietcong and Hanoi to agree to a negotiated settlement. Quite the contrary has happened. The position of the Vietcong and Hanoi today is even harder than it was last spring.

Why? Why, as we have put more and more of the best troops we have into South Vietnam, as we have escalated the violence of our attacks, have our adversaries become ever more scornful of our proposals to negotiate?

My own belief is that they are convinced that, while the Americans cannot be defeated, the Americans cannot win the war on the ground. This, however, is where the war has to be won, in the villages of South Vietnam, and that is where the struggle will in the end be decided. The essential fact, which is beginning to seep through the dispatches of some of the American correspondents, is that while the Americans can seize almost any place they choose to attack, the Vietcong will almost surely come back once the Americans leave.

The war in Vietnam is like punching a tub full of water. We can make a hole with our powerful fist wherever we punch the water. But once we pull back our hand, possibly to punch another hole in the water, the first hole disappears. In theory, the Saigonese army ought to fill the hole, ought to occupy and pacify the places we seize. But the Saigonese army is not able to do this because it is too small and too war weary.

It is too small because the villages, which are the reservoir of available manpower, are for the most part Vietcong in their sympathies or are terrorized by the Vietcong. The Saigonese army is too disillusioned and has too little morale to occupy territory which the Americans have seized. What remains of the Saigonese army has little enthusiasm for the revolving politicians in Saigon.

There are some Republican politicians who think that this mess can be disentangled or ended by bombing the industrial, and therefore populated, centers of Hanoi and Haiphong. The President, fortunately, has

resisted the temptation to make the war a total war, and thus to make it a general Asian war.

In any event, our adversaries in the Vietcong and in Hanoi show no signs of being intimidated by the possibility of total war. The Vietcong in the south are already receiving the full treatment of total war by our area bombing, and the North Vietnamese do not value their material possessions, which are few, nor even their lives, which are short and unhappy, as do the people of a country who have much to lose and much to live for.

Our adversaries, moreover, have time to wait, time to retreat, to hide, and to live to fight another day. So we shall be forced to face the fact that in order to win the war in South Vietnam we shall have to occupy South Vietnam with American troops. A few months ago Mr. Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New York Times, called for a million men for Vietnam. It sounded fantastic at the time in the light of what President Johnson was saying about not wanting a wider war. But it is beginning to look very much as if Mr. Baldwin had made an informed and realistic estimate of what a military solution would require.

The situation has become so tangled that no clear and decisive solution is for the present conceivable. The President is no nearer the negotiated settlement which he has hoped to bring about. Nor, as a matter of fact, is the administration truly resolved to negotiate in a sense that it is prepared, even in its private thinking, to make the concessions that any successful negotiation is bound to call for.

Failing the prospect of a settlement, the President has managed to obtain the assent of most of the country to the kind of war we are fighting—a sporadic, low-grade war carried on chiefly by a professional American Army. There is no immediate prospect of big battles with big casualties because the Vietcong, so it would seem, have withdrawn into guerrilla warfare. Against the kind of force we have in Vietnam, guerrilla warfare cannot win a victory. But neither can the guerrillas be defeated decisively and put out of business.

If we cannot or will not escalate the war until we have an enormous army which can occupy the country, our best course is to dig in along the coast and begin to discuss with the Vietnamese politicians the formation of a government in Saigon which can negotiate a truce in the civil war. This course will not please the majority of the President's current advisers. But with all due respect to them, how do they propose to win this war, specifically, what size of American Army are they prepared to draft and put into Indochina? For the war is not going to be won by punching the water.

Exposing the Auto Pact

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, September 30, 1965

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, this morning Washington Post contains a thoughtful editorial discussing the proposed automotive trade agreement between the United States and Canada. In my judgment, the editorial raises a number of points of concern to many Members of the House. Many of them have been made before by Mr. Allan Levine of Lowell, Mass., president of the Auto-

otive Service Industry Association, who testified before the House Ways and Means Committee on behalf of independent parts producers in the United States.

In my judgment, this editorial deserves the attention of the House and under unanimous consent I include it in the Record at this point:

EXPOSING THE AUTO PACT

Will the American public benefit by the proposed automotive tariff agreement with Canada? A small band of Senate skeptics—Senators GORE, HARTKE, and RUMSFORD—has subjected the administration's measure to a searching analysis and reached the same verdict as this newspaper. Congressional approval of the executive agreement between President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson would have a deleterious effect upon the domestic economy and a positively pernicious effect on this country's reputation as a leading proponent of freer world trade.

The essentials of this unusual trade agreement are these: Canada is to eliminate its tariffs on automobiles and parts for new autos that are imported from this country by designated manufacturers. The United States is to permit the duty-free entry of Canadian produced autos and parts, irrespective of who does the importing in return for the privilege of duty-free imports the leading domestic auto manufacturers, through their Canadian subsidiaries have agreed to a sharp increase in the volume of Canadian auto production.

Proponents of the agreement proclaim that greater output at lower costs will be achieved in what they visualize as an integrated North American market for autos. But this roseate view blinks at the asymmetrical nature of the agreement. Only the Canadian manufacturers, not the consumers, will enjoy the blessings of duty-free trade under this agreement. As long as auto prices in Canada remain much higher than they are in this country, it is difficult to envisage a great expansion of the market.

One can sympathize with the Canadian desire to maintain a strong and growing automotive industry. But sympathy is hardly an excuse for entering into an agreement which will ruin a number of independent parts manufacturers in this country and increase the market power of the leading auto makers. The agreement, to be sure, provides very liberal adjustment assistance for displaced workers. But why should they be displaced? Surely the threatened domestic parts manufacturers are at least as efficient, if not more so, than their Canadian counterparts.

The auto agreement is particularly inappropriate at a time when there is anxiety over this country's balance-of-payments position. In order to fulfill their obligations to the Canadian Government and provide 60,000 new jobs over the next 3 years, the Canadian auto subsidiaries will have to invest about \$1 billion in new productive facilities. It is reasonable to assume that most of the required capital will be raised in this country, thus swelling the payments deficit.

It is conceded that the auto pact violates the most-favored-nation principle of tariff concessions, but proponents are confident that a waiver can be obtained from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva. But there is grave doubt as to whether a waiver can be obtained without making substantial compensation to countries that are not parties to the auto treaty. Moreover, the granting of a waiver will open the door to other restrictionist agreements.

Great pressure is being exerted to pass a radical trade measure that may work against the national interest. Rather than legislate hastily and regret it later on, the Senate should defer final action pending a thorough investigation and report by the Tariff Commission.